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 Abstract - Arc flash generally refers to the dangerous 
exposure to thermal energy released by an arcing fault on an 
electrical power system, and in recent years, arc flash hazards 
have become a prominent safety issue in many industries.  This 
problem however, has not been effectively addressed in the 
mining industry.  MSHA data for the period 1990 through 2001 
attributes 836 injuries to “non-contact electric arc burns”, 
making it the most common cause of electrical injury in mining. 
This paper presents results from several elements of a recent 
NIOSH study of arc flash hazards in mining, and provides 
information and recommendations that can help reduce these 
injuries.  Characteristics of past arc flash injuries in mining are 
first outlined, such as the electrical components and work 
activities involved (based on MSHA data).  This is followed by a 
review of important concepts and terminology needed to 
understand this hazard.  Next, methods for identifying, 
measuring, and managing arc flash hazards on a power system 
are covered, with emphasis on recommendations found in NFPA 
70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace.  Finally, 
results are presented from a detailed arc flash hazard analysis 
performed on a sample mine electrical power system using IEEE 
1584-2004a, focusing on components and locations presenting 
severe hazards as well as engineering solutions for reducing the 
risk to personnel.
 Index terms – electrical arcing, electrical burns, mining, arc 
flash hazard analysis 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
Over the last 20 years or more, much progress has been 
made toward protecting workers from electrical arc flash 
hazards.  In the past, this problem was often not well 
understood or managed, but significant advances have been 
made in understanding electrical arcing faults and the 
potential for injuries, as well as methods to quantify arc flash 
hazards, reduce or eliminate them, and protect workers. 
During the period 1992 through 2002 there was an overall 
decrease in the rate of electrical burns for all industries in the 
U.S., with industries such as construction and transportation 
exhibiting a significant decrease [1].  The increasing attention 
to arc flash hazards in recent years, including the evolution of 
NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, 
may well be partially responsible for this trend [2].  Mining 
has seen no such sustained improvement however, with the 
1 The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do 
not necessarily represent the views of the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health. 
nonfatal electrical burn injury rate remaining constant or 
increasing for seven of ten years over the same period. 
A recent study at the NIOSH Pittsburgh Research 
Laboratory looked at the issue of arc flash burns in the 
mining industry.  To help characterize this problem, this work 
reviewed 836 injuries identified by the Mine Safety and 
Health Administration (MSHA) as “non-contact electric arc 
burns”, occurring from 1990 to 2001. The bituminous coal 
sector accounted for 55% of the injuries, followed by crushed 
stone and, sand and gravel at 21% and 10% respectively. 
Underground operations had 42% of the total, mills and 
plants 26%, and surface mines 22%.  Predictably, the victims 
were most often electricians and mechanics, making up 59% 
of the group, but preparation plant workers and laborers were 
also represented.  As also may be expected, the most common 
work activity was “electrical maintenance/repair”, but in 
addition to troubleshooting and repair work, a large number 
of arc flash incidents were caused by normal operation and 
subsequent failure of equipment such as circuit breakers.  In 
addition to circuit breakers, other electrical system 
components commonly involved were conductors, non-
powered hand tools, electrical meters, and plugs or 
connectors.  Of the 35% of cases reporting system voltage, 
84% were operating at 600V or less, and another 10% at 
1000V or more. 
Title 30 Code of Federal Regulations (30 CFR) contains 
electrical safety regulations for the mining industry [3]. 
Several sections of 30 CFR require personal protective 
equipment (PPE) such as voltage-rated gloves for certain 
tasks and circumstances, but there are no explicit 
requirements for protecting workers from arc flash hazards. 
With a lack of guidance on arc flash protection, one 
potentially effective solution is to apply the requirements 
found in NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the 
Workplace. The current revision of this standard contains 
extensive recommendations for protecting workers not only 
from electrical shock, but from arc flash injuries.  NFPA 70E 
does not itself carry the force of law, but in industries 
monitored by OSHA (enforcing  29 CFR) it is used as a 
template against which to judge workplace electrical safety 
[4]. 
The scope of NFPA 70E specifically excludes certain types 
of power systems, including those in underground mines and 
powering mobile surface mining equipment.  Many of its 
U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright 
concepts and requirements however, particularly those within 
the Safety-Related Work Practices sections, can readily be 
applied to protecting workers in a mining environment.  More 
specifically, NFPA 70E offers guidance on topics such as 
organizing and managing safe electrical work, worker 
training and qualifications, safety programs, job analysis, 
minimizing work on energized circuits, and using proper 
planning, procedures, and equipment when working on 
energized circuits. 
II. MINE POWER SYSTEM ARC FLASH HAZARD ANALYSIS 
As part of recent NIOSH research examining the problem 
of arc flash injuries in mining, an example underground 
bituminous coal mine power system was analyzed to 
determine the presence and extent of arc flash hazards.  The 
approach used for this analysis is found in NFPA 70E. 
A. Arc flash hazard analysis requirements and approach 
The most effective means to protect workers from both 
shock and arc flash hazards is to de-energize circuits before 
performing any work on or near exposed conductors.  NFPA 
70E stresses this point in its coverage of safety-related work 
practices.  This standard however, also acknowledges that 
there are some circumstances where tasks must be performed 
on energized circuits, such as when troubleshooting. 
Similarly, 30 CFR (75.820(b)) recommends de-energizing 
mine power system circuits before work, but recognizes 
exceptions for troubleshooting and testing.  NFPA 70E article 
130.3 requires that if work must be done on or near energized 
circuits, a flash hazard analysis must be conducted.2  A flash 
hazard analysis has two components, first determining the 
flash protection boundary, and then determining the flame 
resistant clothing and other PPE that is required to protect 
someone working inside the flash protection boundary. 
Several basic concepts and definitions are key to 
understanding how arc flash hazards are measured, and how 
this information can be used to help protect personnel.  Arc  
flash hazards are described in terms of energy, and energy is 
defined as the product of power and time, such as in the unit 
kWatt-hours used to describe electrical energy usage.  An arc 
flash releases energy in several forms, including light energy 
and mechanical energy, but current analysis methods focus 
specifically on the thermal energy hazard to workers.  The 
term incident energy is used to describe the thermal energy to 
which a worker is exposed in an arc flash incident, and it can 
be defined as the thermal energy impressed on a surface at 
some specified distance from the source of an arc flash. 
Incident energy is a function of several parameters that we 
can measure or calculate for a power system. 
•	 Arcing fault current magnitude, which, depending 
on system voltage, may be slightly less than the 
bolted fault current for the same location 
2 The term “flash hazard analysis” will be changed to “arc flash hazard 
analysis” in the 2009 edition of NFPA 70E.  This change is included in 
proposal 70E-39 in the NFPA 70E Report on Proposals at www.nfpa.org 
•	 Duration of the arcing fault, that is, the time it takes 
the system to clear the fault 
•	 Distance from a worker to the arc 
•	 Other factors such as conductor spacing, 
confinement in an enclosure, and system grounding 
The most commonly used units for incident energy are 
calories/cm2 (cal/cm2) and Joules/cm2 (J/cm2).3 
Another important term is flash protection boundary, 
which is defined as the distance from an arc flash source 
within which an unprotected person has a 50% chance of 
receiving a second degree burn (a curable burn).4  Incident 
energy of 1.2 cal/cm2 (5 J/cm2) on unprotected skin is the 
generally accepted threshold for a 50% chance of sustaining a 
second degree burn [5].  Arc-rated clothing have an Arc 
Thermal Performance Value (ATPV) designation, which is 
the incident energy in cal/cm2 (J/cm2) for which the garment 
can limit heat transfer to the wearer to 1.2 cal/cm2 (5 J/cm2).5 
NFPA 70E outlines two acceptable approaches for 
conducting a flash hazard analysis.  One approach employs 
general guidelines and tables found in that standard (article 
130.3(A) & (B), table 130.7(C)(9)(a), and table 
130.7(C)(10)), that can be used to determine flash protection 
boundaries and PPE requirements without doing a 
comprehensive power system analysis.  Take for example the 
task of removing a “starter bucket” from a motor control 
center on a 480 V power system branch on which a fault of 
50 kA will clear in 6 cycles or less.  General guidelines 
assign this situation a flash protection boundary of 4 ft (122 
cm), and as shown in figure 1, Hazard/Risk Category 3 PPE 
is required for the job. Hazard/Risk Category (HRC) is a 
hazard severity classification system detailed in NFPA 70E 
that specifies minimum arc flash PPE based on incident 
energy ranges. The HRC system is summarized in figure 2. 
The simplified approach found in NFPA 70E however, may 
not be applicable to some maintenance tasks, or on power 
systems with available fault currents or fault clearing times 
outside certain limits.  Additionally, these simplified methods 
may yield unacceptably conservative PPE requirements. 
Another approach is to perform more comprehensive arc 
flash hazard calculations involving detailed power system 
parameters.  This approach can accurately quantify arc flash 
hazards on a wide range of power systems, but such an 
analysis can be very time consuming and costly to perform. 
Currently, one of the most common methods used to perform 
a comprehensive arc flash hazard analysis is IEEE standard 
1584 -2004a, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard 
Calculations [6].  Commercially available power system 
3 1 Calorie = 4.184 Joules, and 1 Joule = 1 Watt-second. 
4 The term “flash protection boundary” will be changed to “arc flash 
protection boundary” in the 2009 edition of NFPA 70E.  This change is 
included in proposal 70E-39 in the NFPA 70E Report on Proposals at 
www.nfpa.org.
5 The arc-rating of clothing may designate Breakopen Threshold Energy 
(EBT) instead of ATPV.  This indicates that breakopen of the fire resistant 
material (exposing skin or underlying layers), rather than heat transfer 
through the material, limits the protection afforded by the clothing.  See 
ASTM 1506-02a for more information on ATPV and EBT. 
Table 130.7(C)(9)(a)  Hazard/Risk Category Classifications
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Figure 1.  Excerpt from NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), showing the arc flash Hazard/Risk Category 
for removing a starter bucket from a 480 V motor control center 
Figure 2. Summary of arc flash Hazard Risk Categories, based on NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)(11) and *article 130.7(C)(5) 
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Figure 3.  Layout of example underground coal mine
  used for arc flash hazard analysis 
short tons (227k and 907k metric tons) per year.  Based on 
this data, a mine producing approximately 500k short tons 
(454 metric tons) per year was used to represent a small 
underground coal mine for a mine power system arc flash 
hazard analysis. 
Using a 500k short tons (454 metric tons) per year target, 
an example mine and the necessary electrical power system 
were designed. The mine has shaft and slope access to an 
8000 ft x 8000 ft (2438 m x 2438 m) reserve with 6 ft (183 
cm) seam height. The operation has 2 continuous mining 
sections employing room and pillar development and full 
retreat.  Shuttle cars are used for face haulage and beltlines 
for main haulage.  Additional details are listed in Appendix I. 
Figure 3 shows the mine’s general layout. 
C. Arc flash hazard analysis method and software 
The arc flash hazard analysis for the example underground 
bituminous coal mine was done using a commercially 
available power system analysis software package.  The 
software applies IEEE standard 1584 – 2004a to determine 
incident energies to which workers could be exposed during 
three phase power system arcing faults.  Quantifying incident 
energy allows determination of the flash protection boundary 
and necessary PPE when working inside this boundary.  IEEE 
1584 employs an empirically-derived model for systems 
between 208 V and 15 kV with bolted fault currents between 
700 A and 106 kA, and uses a separate theoretical model for 
systems above 15 kV.  Other limitations apply to the use of 
these models, and are outlined in detail in the standard.  Note 
that the standard focuses only on the incident energy hazard 
presented by an arc flash, and does not consider hazards from 
molten metal, projectiles, pressure waves, or toxic by-
products. 
Although IEEE 1584 deals primarily with the development 
and use of the empirical and theoretical models needed for 
determining arc flash hazards, it presents them within the 
framework of a 9 step analysis process. 
1)	 Compile detailed power system information for 
power sources, conductors, transformers, loads, and 
circuit protection devices 
2) Identify system modes of operation that provide 
maximum and minimum three phase fault currents 
3) Calculate the three phase bolted fault current and 
X/R ratio for each point of interest on the system 
4)	 Calculate arcing fault current for each point, and 
determine the current passing through the associated 
protective device(s) 
5)	 Determine the duration of the arcing fault for each 
point, based on protective device characteristics and 
settings 
6) Identify equipment voltage/class for each point to 
determine typical conductor spacing 
7) Select working distance (normally assumed as the 
distance from conductors to a worker’s face or torso) 
8) Determine the incident energy to which a worker 
would be exposed, at each point 
9)	 Determine the flash protection boundary at each 
point (normally considered to be the distance at 
which incident energy is 1.2 cal/cm2 (5 J/cm2) 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe in detail 
each of the steps listed above, or the actual use of the power 
system analysis software, but a number of key points are 
listed in Appendix II to help guide the reader interested in 
conducting similar flash hazard analyses. 
D.  Arc flash hazard analysis results 
Using the example mine and procedures just described, an 
arc flash analysis was performed to examine specific 
locations on a mine power system where an arcing fault could 
be initiated during maintenance or routine operation of 
equipment.  Three cases are presented below.   In the initial 
modeling of the power system, circuit protection devices 
were sized and adjusted to provide equipment protection and 
optimum system selectivity (coordination of devices for good 
continuity of operation).  For each case, trials were run with 
and without motor contributions to fault current, and the 
condition creating the more severe arc flash hazard was used. 
Because incident energy is a function of available fault 
current, time, and distance from the arc, a lower fault current 
can be counteracted by the associated increase in fault 
clearing time and produce a higher energy.  Results for each 
case list incident energy (IE), flash protection boundary 
(FPB), and hazard/risk category (HRC).  Each case first lists 
the potential arc flash hazard for the power system in its 
original configuration. Then, some condition or sizing of a 
circuit protection device is changed to illustrate the effect on 
the arc flash hazard.  Case 2 includes an evaluation using the 
NFPA 70E simplified method described earlier, as a 
comparison to the results obtained from the detailed analysis 
using IEEE 1584. 
1) 7200 V switch house - Case 1: This case considers an 
arcing fault on the input conductors of the first 7200 V 
distribution switch house downstream of the mine power 
borehole.  Figure 4 is the switch house one-line diagram.  The  
Main SH in 
7200 V 
E mains 
slp btm feed 
E mns 50/51 
slpbtm 50/51 
UG shp feed 
UGshp 50/51 
Case 1 Fault 
Main Mine Power Feed 
Switch House 
Figure 4.  One-line diagram for 7200 V distribution 
switch house in analysis case 1 
fault is cleared by 50/51 electronic relays and a vacuum 
breaker upstream at the mine substation output.6 
•	 FPB = 81 in (206 cm) 
•	 IE = 2.6 cal/cm2 (10.9 J/cm2) at 36 in (91 cm) 
working distance (36 in (91cm) is the default 
working distance for 5 kV and 15 kV class 
switchgear in IEEE 1584) 
•	 HRC 1 
36 in (91 cm) may not be a realistic working distance for this 
situation, therefore the analysis was run again with a working 
distance of 18 in (46 cm). 
•	 IE = 5.2 cal/cm2 (21.8 J/cm2) at 18 in (46 cm) 
•	 HRC 2 
This doubled the incident energy, increasing the HRC by one 
level. 
Figure 5 shows an electrical hazard warning label 
appropriate for the above switch house.  This label was 
automatically generated by the software used for the analysis, 
and includes information for arc flash and electrical shock 
protection. 
6 50 and 51 are IEEE device identification numbers for instantaneous and 
time delay overcurrent relays, respectively. 
Figure 5.  Electrical hazard warning label generated by power system 
analysis software, for the 7200 V switch house in case 1 
2) Slope bottom load center 600 V output – Case 2: This 
case considers an arcing fault on the secondary of a load 
center 2-winding 750 kVA transformer, upstream of the 
main  600 V bus circuit breaker in that load center. This case 
is illustrated in figure 6 (Fault A).  The fault is cleared by 
8250 V 65 A current limiting fuses at the transformer primary 
in the load center. 
•	 FPB = 95 in (241 cm) 
•	 IE = 18.2 cal/cm2 (76.2 J/cm2) at 18 in (46 cm) 
working distance 
•	 HRC 3 
A significant arc flash hazard exists at this location, and 
should be reduced if possible.  Note that the current limiting 
capability of the fuses involved does not mitigate the arc flash 
hazard because the fault current is not high enough to cause 
the fuses to open in their current limiting range (current 
limiting clearing time of ½ cycle or less). Current limiting 
fuses however, can help reduce an arc flash hazard when high 
incident energy is due to high available fault current. 
Reducing the ampere rating of the fuses clearing this fault 
will help to limit the hazard, although there will be some loss 
of selectivity in overall system protection, and nuisance 
tripping may become a problem. The analysis was run again 
with fuse size reduced from 65 A to 50 A (for the model of 
fuse specified for this transformer, a wide range of current 
ratings have the same physical size and configuration). 
•	 FPB = 55 in (140 cm) 
•	 IE = 7.5 cal/cm2 (31.4 J/cm2) at 18 in (46 cm) 
working distance 
•	 HRC 2 
The smaller fuse size cuts incident energy by over 50% due 
to a shorter clearing time, and the HRC drops one level. 
S 
P slp-btm LC xfr 
slp-btm LC in 
LCout main bkr 
LC xfr fuse 
LCout 600V bus 
7200 V 
Case 2  Fault A 
Case 2  Fault B 
Slope Bottom Load Center 
Figure 6.  One line diagram for slope bottom load center 
600 V output in analysis case 2 
If additional loss of selectivity and nuisance tripping can be 
tolerated, the hazard can be reduced even further by installing 
40 A fuses, with the following results. 
•	 FPB = 34 in (86 cm) 
•	 IE = 3.3 cal/cm2 (13.8 J/cm2) at 18 in (46 cm) 
working distance 
•	 HRC 1 
If for some reason 80 A fuses are installed at the 
transformer primary at this location, analysis reveals the 
following (80 A is larger than needed for this application). 
•	 FPB = 161 in (409 cm) 
•	 IE = 43.7 cal/cm2 (182.8 J/cm2) at 18 in (46 cm) 
working distance 
•	 Exceeds HRC 4 
The potential incident energy exceeds 40 cal/cm2 (167 J/cm2), 
and any unprotected worker within approximately 13 ft (396 
cm) of the arc could be seriously injured.  At levels above 40 
cal/cm2 (167 J/cm2) NFPA 70E recommends that under no 
circumstances should work be performed on the circuit while 
energized, due to the extreme hazard.  Prohibiting live work 
however, does not completely eliminate the risk since many 
arcing faults are caused by electrical equipment failure during 
normal operation. 
If the arcing fault in this load center occurs just 
downstream of the main circuit breaker protecting the 600 V 
bus, (Fault B in figure 6), the fault is cleared by that circuit 
breaker instead of the transformer fuses. 
•	 FPB = 16 in (41 cm) 
•	 IE = 1 cal/cm2 (4.2 J/cm2) at 18 in (46 cm) working 
distance 
•	 HRC 0 
Because of the reduced clearing time, the incident energy is 
quite low, and requires minimal protection as listed in figure 
2. 
As a comparison of analysis approaches, the preceding 
situation (where the arc flash occurs just downstream of the 
600 V circuit breaker) was re-evaluated using simplified 
methods employing guidelines and tables in NFPA 70E 
instead of detailed IEEE 1584 calculations.  If the task being 
performed on the circuit is voltage measurement or other 
energized work, NFPA 70E article 130.3(A) and table 
130.7(C)(9)(a) specify the following. 
•	 FPB = 48 in (122 cm) 
•	 IE is not quantified in this method 
•	 HRC 2, with addition of HRC 3 head/face 
protection7 
The flash protection boundary and protective equipment 
requirements generated by this approach are very 
conservative compared to those indicated by a detailed 
analysis. 
3) 2 North load center 600 V output - Case 3: Here an 
arcing fault occurs on the 600 V secondary of a load center 3­
winding 1250 kVA transformer, upstream of the main 600 V 
bus breaker in that load center. The one-line diagram for this 
case is shown in figure 7.  The load center transformer is 
protected by 8250 V 80 A current limiting fuses at its 
primary, but due to necessary coordination compromises in 
the original power system design, the fault is cleared by 
50/51 relays and a vacuum breaker at a 7200 V switch house 
approximately  2000 ft (610 m) upstream. 
•	 FPB = 175 in (445 cm) 
•	 IE = 50.1 cal/cm2 (209.6 J/cm2) at 18 in (46 cm) 
working distance 
•	 Exceeds HRC 4 
Although the combined capacity of this 3-winding 
transformer suggests that 80 A fuses are required, their use 
and the associated adjustment of the upstream relays creates 
an unacceptably high arc flash hazard at the 600 V secondary. 
7 The 2009 edition of NFPA 70E will allow the use of an arc rated face 
shield worn with an arc rated balaclava (sock hood) in lieu of a full switching 
hood (HRC 3 head/face protection).  This change is included in proposal 
70E-356 in the NFPA 70E Report on Proposals at www.nfpa.org. 
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Figure 7.  One line diagram for 2 North load center 
600 V output in analysis case 3 
An arcing fault at this point could potentially injure 
unprotected workers over 14 ft (427 cm) away. 
As was described in case 2, reducing fuse size may be a 
practical solution for mitigating an arc flash hazard if field 
experience shows that it will not cause unacceptable nuisance 
tripping.  For the 2 North load center with the fuse ratings 
reduced from 80 A to 65 A, the fuses now clear the fault. 
•	 FPB = 160 in (406 cm) 
•	 IE = 43.0 cal/cm2 (179.9J/cm2) at 18 in (46 cm) 
working distance 
•	 Exceeds HRC 4 
As can be seen from these results however, the reduction in 
clearing time is not sufficient to reduce the arc flash hazard to 
a manageable level. 
Reducing the fuse size to 50 A gives the following results. 
•	 FPB = 88 in (224 cm) 
•	 IE = 16.3 cal/cm2 (68.2 J/cm2) at 18 in (46 cm) 
working distance 
•	 HRC 3 
The arc flash hazard is still significant, but energized work is 
possible with proper precautions and protective equipment. 
Another solution to the extreme arc flash hazard at the 2 
North load center is the replacement of the 3-winding 
transformer with two 2-winding transformers, each with 
properly sized fuses at their primaries (separate 600 V and 
995 V output transformers).  This approach of course would 
involve a complete redesign of the load center, and so would 
often not be feasible on an existing system. Even for a new 
load center, the additional cost and space required for 
multiple transformers may be difficult to accommodate. If 
implemented however, the use of smaller fuses possible with 
2 separate transformers would help reduce incident energy. 
In the 2 North load center for example, an individual 7200 V 
to 600 V 500 kVA transformer would require a 40 A fuse, 
resulting in the following potential arc flash hazard. 
•	 FPB = 57 in (145 cm) 
•	 IE = 7.9 cal/cm2 (33.0 J/cm2) at 18 in (46 cm) 
working distance 
•	 HRC 2 
E.  Important points from arc flash hazard analysis results 
The arc flash hazard analysis performed on the example 
mine illustrates a number of important points, both about arc 
flash hazards on mine power systems and for such analyses in 
general. 
•	 Arc flash analyses must consider all likely power 
system configurations and modes of operation, since 
the highest available fault current for a given point 
often does not deliver the highest incident energy 
•	 For analysis of an existing power system, it is 
essential that information such as cable sizes and 
lengths, load characteristics, and protective device 
characteristics and adjustments be complete and 
accurate 
•	 Coordination of power system circuit protection 
devices for optimum selectivity does not necessarily 
prevent or reduce arc flash hazards on the system 
•	 Numerous locations on a “typical” mine power 
system can present arc flash hazards, with some 
locations having the potential for extremely 
dangerous arcing faults 
•	 Arc flash hazards can be reduced in many cases by 
proper selection or adjustment of circuit protection 
devices such as fuses, although some loss of 
selectivity may be necessary 
•	 The secondaries of 3-winding transformers in load 
centers can present arc flash hazard levels too 
dangerous to allow energized work under any 
circumstances (exceeding HRC 4) 
•	 Some hazards may require re-engineering the power 
system or specific components to reduce potential 
incident energy to a manageable level, such as using 
multiple transformers instead of a single 2 or 3 
winding transformer in a load center 
•	 Notwithstanding the simplified guidelines and tables 
found in NFPA 70E, voltage level, available power, 
or equipment type cannot be used as reliable 
indications of potential arc flash hazards, rather, a 
comprehensive analysis must be performed to 
positively identify and quantify these hazards 
•	 The use of current limiting fuses does not in itself 
always help to reduce or eliminate arc flash hazards, 
since the fault current in question may be below that 
necessary for the fuse to operate in its current 
limiting range 
•	 Equipment should be labeled to clearly 
communicate electrical hazards to workers 
•	 Arc flash analyses should use realistic working 
distances for electrical equipment in a mining 
environment 
•	 The extent and severity of arc flash hazards on mine 
power systems reinforces the importance of avoiding 
work on energized circuits except when absolutely 
necessary 
•	 It is important that personnel carrying out arc flash 
hazard analyses thoroughly understand the process 
and methods involved, in order to accurately assess 
hazards as well as recognize suspect results 
III. SUMMARY 
Electrical arc flash incidents were the most common cause 
of nonfatal electrical injuries in the U.S. mining industry 
from 1996 to 2005. These incidents often occur during 
electrical maintenance and repair work, and involve 
electricians and mechanics, but they can also be the result of 
unexpected failure of electrical equipment such as circuit 
breakers during normal operation, and endanger other 
workers as well.  Arc flash hazards are an issue that has not 
yet been effectively addressed in the mining industry, but 
intervention strategies and techniques developed in other 
industries over the last two decades can be applied to help 
solve this problem.  NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical 
Safety in the Workplace, is the most comprehensive and 
widely used source for recommendations on this topic.  As 
part of a NIOSH study of arc flash hazards in mining, a 
comprehensive arc flash hazard analysis as proscribed by 
NFPA 70E was performed on the power system for a small 
underground bituminous coal mine. The study revealed that 
such a power system has many locations that can endanger 
personnel, ranging from some requiring minimal protective 
arc flash rated clothing and equipment, to those that dictate 
major system changes or redesign to manage the flash hazard. 
The analysis results confirm that the mining industry needs to 
aggressively address the problem of electrical arc flash 
injuries.  Prevention efforts must include better management 
of electrical work, including minimizing work on energized 
circuits, use of safe procedures for maintenance and repair 
work, and use of proper protective clothing and equipment, as 
well as consideration of arc flash hazards in power system 
design and maintenance, and improved employee education 
and training.   Additionally, arc flash incidents occurring 
during normal operation of power system components point 
to a need to improve the design, installation, and maintenance 
of such components, as well as include arc flash hazard 
awareness as part of electrical safety education for all 
employees. 
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APPENDIX I 
Example Mine and Mine Power System Design Detail 
•	 There is 1 continuous miner per section 
•	 Total mine production is estimated at 575k raw short tons (522k metric tons) per year, based on continuous mining 
production estimates from existing mines in southwestern PA using two 8-hour production shifts/day, 5 production 
days per week, and an average development/retreat ratio of 2/1 
•	 The power system model places both continuous miner sections near their maximum distance from the power bore 
hole, 4000 ft to 5000 ft (1219 m to 1524 m) 
•	 Maximum haulage beltline length is 2000 ft (607 m) 
•	 Maximum grade of the seam is 2.5% 
•	 Rubber tired/battery powered equipment is used for supply and personnel transport 
•	 The mine has a large underground equipment maintenance shop 
•	 All underground loads are supplied by a single substation and radial distribution system (surface facilities are on their 
own separate substation) 
•	 The power system conforms to current 30 CFR requirements 
•	 The utility bus is assumed to be 1000 MVA at X/R = 10 
•	 High voltage distribution is 7200 Vac nominal, continuous miners are 950 Vac nameplate, and all other equipment is 
550 Vac nameplate except for 460 Vac loads in the underground shop 
•	 Cables were sized using a load factor method, all motor efficiencies = 0.93, demand factor outby the East Mains @ 1 
North intersection = 0.8 
•	 Transformers are all delta-wye with high resistance grounded secondaries  (15 A limit) 
•	 Transformer taps are set to give < 5% voltage drop at all loads, based on a load flow study 
•	 High voltage distribution is protected by 50/51 electronic relays and vacuum circuit breakers 
•	 E-rated current limiting fuses protect the load center transformer primaries 
•	 Molded case circuit breakers protect utilization voltage portable power cables 
APPENDIX II 
Example Mine Power System Modeling Detail 
•	 It is assumed that any line to line fault will almost immediately escalate to involve all three phases as air ionizes 
across them, therefore only three phase faults are considered in the analysis  (this is a general assumption in IEEE 
1584) 8 
•	 The analysis modeled faults both without motor fault current contributions, and with 1 cycle contributions for all 
motors 50 hp (37.3 kW) or larger 
•	 All mine power and trailing cable data were entered manually, using typical mining cable characteristics as published 
in The Mining Cable Engineering Handbook, by the Anaconda Co., 1977 9 
•	 A number of power system characteristics were set at the software default values, such as transformer inrush = 12X 
full load current for 0.1s, cable damage temperatures  are 90 degree  C continuous and 250 degree C maximum, and 
motor starting current at full voltage = 5.9X full load current for 10 s 
•	 Arc flash maximum duration was set at the software default of 1000s (this feature allows the software user to account 
for a worker’s reaction to move away from the arc flash, therefore, a very large value such as 1000s assumes that a 
worker will not react to move away prior to the fault being cleared) 
•	 Fault current tolerances were set to -15% and +0% (these values are recommended in IEEE 1584) 
•	 The energy accumulation threshold was set at 70%, to enable a software feature that checks for miscoordination of 
protective devices (the concept of energy accumulation accounts for multiple parallel sources of fault current that have 
different clearing times, and so contribute different amounts to the overall incident energy during an arcing fault) 
•	 Vacuum breaker opening time was set to 0.300 s 
8 It should be noted that electrical power systems in U.S. coal mines have unique design features, required by 30 CFR, that help reduce the potential for

dangerous arcing faults.  High resistance grounding limits the current available at a ground fault until ground fault protection de-energizes the circuit involved,

greatly reducing the chance of escalation to a three phase fault.  In addition, grounded shielding in large portable power cables reduces the chance of a high

energy fault in the event of cable damage.

9 Use of product or company names does not imply endorsement by the authors, NIOSH, or the federal government.

